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Abstract   
This study used probabilistic elicitation and a Bayesian framework to quantitatively 
explore how logically practitioners’ update their clinical beliefs after exposure to new data. 
The clinical context was the efficacy of antibiotics versus teat sealants for preventing 
mammary infections during the dry period. While most practitioners updated their clinical 
expectations logically, the majority failed to draw sufficient strength from the new data so 
that their clinical confidence afterwards was lower than merited. This study provides 
quantitative insight into how practitioners’ update their beliefs. We discuss some of the 
psychological issues that may be faced by practitioners when interpreting new data. The 
results have important implications for evidence-based practice and clinical research in terms 
of the impact that new data may bring to the clinical community.  
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1.  Introduction  
A Bayesian statistical framework is ideally suited to and increasingly being used in 
evidence-based medicine (Ashby, 2006). This approach is conceptually straightforward. 
There are always two sources of information, the new data arising from a recent experiment 
and the prior information (Spiegelhalter et al., 2000). Prior information is any pre-existing 
information of relevance to the parameter of interest that has not arisen from the new 
experiment. The prior information must be expressed in a quantitative format as a probability 
distribution, called ‘the prior’ (Garthwaite et al., 2005). The information originating from the 
new data is summarised by a likelihood function. To conduct the analysis, Bayes theorem is 
used to combine the prior with the likelihood function and produce a posterior probability 
distribution (Bayes, 1763). Bayes theorem expresses how the prior information should, 
logically, be updated in light of the new evidence. Hence the posterior distribution 
encapsulates everything that is now known about the parameter, having updated the prior 
with the new data (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004). If the prior information is weak (i.e. contains 
considerable uncertainty), and the new data comparatively strong, the posterior will be 
dominated by the new data, and vice versa.  
By always including prior information formally in the statistical analysis itself, Bayesian 
statistics quantitatively places the new data in the context of pre-existing knowledge and 
addresses the question: how should the data change what we currently believe? (Spiegelhalter 
et al., 2004). It is, therefore, a formalisation of ‘learning from experience’ and hence 
evidence-based practice (Ashby, 2006). In contrast, the traditional (frequentist) statistical 
framework does not include prior information in the analysis itself and hence the reader is left 
to quantify for themselves how the new data should be combined with prior knowledge to 
arrive at a final answer. There are several possible choices for the prior information, 
including data from previously conducted experiments and ‘off-the-shelf’ theoretical 
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distributions aimed at representing different prior perspectives, for example, a ‘reasonable 
cautious sceptic’ (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994). Another possibility is to base the prior 
information on pre-existing clinical knowledge, which is then referred to as a ‘clinical prior’ 
(Chaloner and Rhame, 2001). In this case, the practitioner’s current belief needs to be 
captured in a numerical format as a probability distribution (Johnson et al., 2010a). The 
technique used to do this is called probabilistic elicitation (O'Hagan et al., 2006).  
Currently, UK National Health Service data monitoring committees may use a Bayesian 
analysis to aid their decisions over when to terminate a trial (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004). 
Clinical priors obtained by eliciting doctors’ beliefs are combined with the accruing trial data. 
When the posterior distribution associated with the most sceptical clinical prior supports the 
new treatment, the trial may be trial stopped on the grounds that the new data will be 
sufficiently strong to convince the medical community (Fayers et al., 1997). The assumption 
underpinning this decision is that doctors will actually update their beliefs in keeping with 
Bayes theorem. There is literature on the intuitiveness of Bayesian logic in several non-
clinical contexts (O'Hagan et al., 2006; Kynn, 2008). Experimental psychologists in the 
1970’s questioned clinicians’ abilities to reason logically due to heuristics. These are quick 
mental strategies that people may employ instinctively to make judgements when faced with 
uncertainty. They can be effective but may lead to severe bias and error (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Cooke, 1991). For example, people often make estimates by starting from 
an initial value and amend this to arrive at a final answer. Even if the initial value is known to 
be arbitrary, people will typically give answers that are biased towards the initial value, the 
so-called anchoring phenomenon (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). There is also 
psychological and behavioural literature indicating that people may react in a negative way 
when their beliefs are challenged, be that emotionally, cognitively or behaviourally (Brehm, 
1966; Politi et al., 2007). Such negative reactions may contravene Bayesian logic.  
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In contrast, there is also recent work suggesting that people’s judgements are very close 
to Bayesian estimates for certain tasks (Baker et al., 2006; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006; 
Westover et al., 2011) and especially when information is represented in a way to facilitate 
Bayesian reasoning (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Gigerenzer, 2011). However, the existing 
literature has predominately involved undergraduate students and lay tasks (Phillips and 
Edwards, 1966; Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006). Given the increased emphasis on evidence 
based medicine and the increased use of Bayesian methods in clinical care, it is of real 
practical interest to understand how practitioners’ update their beliefs compared to Bayes 
Theorem for clinical parameters such as incidence rates using the type of information that is 
published in medical journals. There is, however, a paucity of specific literature.  To start to 
address this research gap, we used the clinical context of dry cow therapy to illustrate a 
simple practical method that may be used to quantitatively investigate how logically 
practitioners update their clinical beliefs compared to Bayes theorem for a continuous clinical 
parameter.  
In the UK, blanket antibiotic dry cow therapy (BDCT) is a commonly used strategy to 
aid mastitis control. It involves the infusion of an intra-mammary antibiotic in all quarters of 
all cows at dry-off, irrespective of infection status. The aim is to cure any pre-existing intra-
mammary infections (IMI) and prevent new IMI over the dry period. An alternative strategy 
is selective dry cow therapy (SDCT) whereby cows with a low probability of an IMI receive 
an internal teat sealant (ITS) instead of antibiotics to prevent new IMI. Using SDCT instead 
of BDCT can considerably reduce antibiotic use. A key clinical question underpinning the 
use of SDCT is whether practitioners believe that ITS is as effective as an antibiotic, or 
better, at preventing new IMI in uninfected quarters. Therefore, this study aimed to quantify 
practitioners’ beliefs for the efficacy of an antibiotics versus ITS, before and after exposure to 
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new data. The study illustrates a practical way to quantitatively investigate how practitioners 
updated their beliefs compared to Bayes theorem.  
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Recruitment of practitioners 
In total, 20 practitioners were recruited from 6 practices in the South of England.  Sample 
size was a pragmatic choice in keeping with existing research involving the elicitation of 
beliefs (Johnson et al., 2010a).  Since we set out to demonstrate a method to quantitatively 
assess changes in belief, rather than to draw inferences to a wider population, we selected 
practices based on the convenience of being within a practical driving distance.  Inclusion 
criteria were practitioners providing healthcare to cattle during their normal working hours. 
Voluntary signed consent was obtained. Individual face-to-face interviews lasting 30 minutes 
were conducted by HMH between 1 December 2014 and 31 January 2015, at the participants’ 
workplaces. A standard script was used for consistency. The script was piloted on 3 
practitioners to ensure the method was tenable. This pilot data is not included.   
  2.2. Clinical context and definition of elicited parameter,  
The population of interest was cows with all four quarters uninfected at dry-off. To 
ensure everyone considered the same population and to avoid any potential confusion over 
uncertainty associated with diagnosing cows as uninfected, it was emphasised to participants 
that when giving their answers the population they must consider were cows that were 
genuinely uninfected (free from both major and minor pathogens) i.e. they must assume that 
this had been 100% reliably established.  
The outcome of interest was the dry period new infection rate, defined as the percentage 
of uninfected quarters that acquire a new infection during the dry period. The new infection 
could be either a major or minor pathogen, and result in either a sub-clinical or clinical 
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infection. To avoid any potential ambiguity associated with diagnosing the new infections, it 
was emphasised to participants that when giving their answers they simply needed to 
consider how many quarters would actually acquire a new infection, and diagnosing this 
infection was not something they needed to think about.  
The two treatments considered at dry-off were (i) a long acting intra-mammary 
suspension containing 0.250g cefalonium per syringe, administered correctly and (ii) an ITS, 
specifically a 4g intra-mammary suspension containing 65% bismuth subnitrate, administered 
correctly. To ensure everyone considered the same baseline, participants were told the 
infection rate with cefalonium was 30%. The elicited parameter, , was the difference in the 
infection rate if an ITS was used instead of cefalonium, i.e. how much higher (+) or lower (-) 
than 30% the infection rate would be with ITS. It was assumed that influencing factors other 
than which treatment was given remained constant and the dry period was 60 days. We chose 
to compare ITS to antibiotics rather than giving no treatment because giving no treatment in 
uninfected cows is generally not considered a tenable option in high yielding dairy cows in 
the UK, mainly due to delay in closure of the teat canal keratin plug (Dingwell et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, we elicited the difference in the infection rates, as opposed to other measures of 
relative efficacy, because we considered adding and subtracting to be the simplest way for 
participants to give their answer.   
    The probability that an ITS treated, uninfected quarter would be infected at calving was 
denoted by . After the interviews were finished, participants beliefs for  were calculated 
using 
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We could have elicited beliefs directly for  (the infection rate with ITS conditional on a 
30% infection rate with cephalonium), rather than the difference. However, by asking for the 
difference it was envisaged that it would facilitate participants to think more carefully about 
which treatment was better (the infection rate with cephalonium was marked in red on the 
chart, see Fig 1). 
2.3. Probabilistic elicitation method to capture beliefs  
A variety of different methods have been reported to elicit beliefs probabilistically 
(Johnson et al., 2010a).  This study used a version of the roulette method (also called chip and 
bins) because it is a method that has been shown to be feasible, valid and reliable for 
capturing beliefs in a clinical setting (Johnson et al., 2010b). Current best practice for 
elicitation was followed (Garthwaite et al., 2005; O'Hagan et al., 2006). This included: (i) a 
face-to-face interview; (ii) providing a training exercise; (iii) use of a standardized script; (iv) 
a design that avoided heuristics; (v) provision of feedback; (vi) opportunity to revise 
responses and (vii) use of simple graphical methods.  
Following the general methodology of Johnson et al. (2010b), participants were asked to 
express their beliefs probabilistically by indicating the weight of their belief for  using 10 
chips each worth 0.1 probability, and placing them in discrete 5 per cent intervals (the bins) 
over the range of . Coins, specifically 5 pence pieces, were used for the chips.  Adhesive 
putty (Blu-Tack®, Bostik) was used to make the coins adhere to, but be easily detached from, 
a laminated sheet. This allowed participants to easily revise their answers.  
(1) 
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The training exercise took approximately 5 minutes. Participants were shown 3 generic 
examples involving 2 treatments, A and B. Each example demonstrated a different belief and 
their meanings were explained (see Fig 1). No context was provided in order to reduce any 
bias. Example 1 (Fig 1) represents a practitioner who “believes confidently” that treatment B 
is definitely inferior to A, because they have assigned 0.8 probability (80% chance) that the 
infection rate will be higher with B by 25-30%. Example 2 represents a practitioner who 
believes that treatment B is definitely superior to A, but they hold a less confident belief 
compared to example 1. Example 3 represents a belief that favours treatment B, but allows 
some probability (0.3 in total) that A is superior. Afterwards, the examples were placed out of 
sight to mitigate bias. 
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Fig.1. The 3 examples used for training. Each circle denotes a 0.10 probability. Example 1 
represents a “confident” belief that treatment B is inferior to A. Example 2 represents the 
belief that treatment B is superior to A; it is a less confident belief relative to example 1. 
Example 3 represents a belief that favours treatment B, but allows some probability that A is 
superior. 
2.4. Task structure and new data presented  
The task itself started by capturing participants’ current beliefs for  as probability 
distributions using the roulette method (see Section 2.3). This distribution is denoted by . 
They were then shown the results (point estimate and 95% classical confidence interval) from 
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a clinical trial. The trial data was fictitious and followed a binomial distribution, Y ~ 
Binomial , where  is the number of uninfected quarters at dry-off ,  is (as defined 
previously) the probability that an ITS treated,  uninfected quarter is infected at calving, and 
the number of infected quarters were realisations, , on the random variable Y.   was set to 
1000, which resulted in 95% confidence intervals that were  ~5% wide i.e. the width of one 
bin. The 95% binomial confidence intervals (Wilson, 1927) were calculated using the 
‘binom’ package in the software program R (R Core Team, 2015). 
The data,  each practitioner was shown was dependent on their prior distribution, as 
follows. The point estimate for the data was centred in the 5% interval adjacent to the mode 
of their prior and favouring cefalonium. For example, the mode of the prior in Example 2, 
Figure 1, is in the lower -(5 to 10)% interval for  (i.e.  0.2-0.25), and the adjacent 
interval to this is -(0 to 5%), (i.e.  = 0.25-0.3). Hence the point estimate of the data would be 
in the middle of this at  = -2.5%. Using Eq. 1, this is  , and with =1000, this 
means  275 infected quarters. By varying the point estimate of the data according to each 
participant’s prior belief, all participants had their prior beliefs challenged to the same extent 
with respect to central location.  
Due to the properties of the binomial distribution, the width of the confidence interval 
each participant was shown differed slightly (range 4.4 - 5.4%) as it was related to their prior 
mode. However, in the context of the precision of the task as it was set (5% interval bins), 
differences in the strength of data they were shown was minor.  
The final part of the task involved re-eliciting the practitioner’s belief for  as a 
probability distribution after seeing the new data using a new set of coins and laminated sheet 
(see Section 2.3). This probability distribution is denoted by . During the interviews, no 
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analysis was done and practitioners were not told how their updated beliefs compared to a 
Bayesian analysis.   
2.5. Initial data manipulation 
The raw data was entered into a Microsoft Excel spread sheet (v2010, Microsoft Corp).  
For each participant, their probability distributions  and  were transformed to probability 
distributions for  using Eq. 1, to yield  and .  Hence  was the practitioner’s prior 
distribution and this will also be referred to as their prior belief for . Similarly,  was their 
elicited posterior distribution and this will also be referred to as their elicited posterior belief 
for . Since the raw data comprised discrete quantities of probability placed in fixed intervals, 
the mean and variance of  and  were simply calculated using 
 
 
where  is the mean, the variance,  took the possible values of 
 corresponding to the mid-point of each interval and  is the 
probability placed in each interval.   A parametric distribution from the Beta family was fitted 
to  and  for each practitioner by equating  and  to the first and second 
moments of the Beta family expressed in terms of its two hyper-parameters , and 
solving the two simultaneous equations (Gupta and Nadarajah, 2004): 
 
 
From the fitted distributions, summary statistics including 95% equal tailed Bayesian credible 
intervals, means and standard deviations were calculated.  
 
(2) 
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2.6. Conjugate Bayesian analysis  
For each practitioner, Bayes theorem was used to combine their prior distribution with 
the new data they were shown, to produce a posterior distribution. This posterior distribution 
is subsequently referred to as their Bayesian posterior distribution (or Bayesian belief) and 
has probability density function, . It is a theoretical distribution that expresses how 
each practitioner should have updated their prior belief, according to Bayes theorem. Since 
Beta distributions were fitted to the prior beliefs and the new data followed a binomial 
distribution, this Bayesian analysis was conjugate with the Bayesian posterior distribution 
also taking the form of Beta distribution: 
 
 
where  and  were derived for each practitioner by solving Eqs. 2,  is the binomial 
likelihood function, =1000 and  varied with the mode of  (see section 2.4) 
By comparing their elicited posterior belief, , with the Bayesian posterior belief, calculated 
from Eq. 3 it was possible to quantify how close practitioners were to Bayesian logic. In this 
respect, for continuous parameters such as , there are two key elements to consider. First, 
whether the elicited posterior belief is centred as in keeping with Bayes theorem, which in 
this context could be termed their ‘clinical expectation’. Second, whether the elicited 
posterior belief carries the appropriate uncertainty, which in this context could be termed 
their ‘clinical confidence’. To make an assessment of each of these, we used the mean and the 
standard deviation of the elicited posterior distribution and the Bayesian posterior 
distribution. We produced scatterplots of the elicited posterior means versus Bayesian 
posterior means, and the elicited posterior standard deviations versus the Bayesian posterior 
(3) 
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standard deviations.  Other metrics for quantifying the overall distance between two 
probability distributions could have been used. However, they are less useful in this context 
because they do not allow a separate assessment of clinical expectations and clinical 
confidence, i.e. the first and second moments of the distributions. 
2.7. Discrete Bayesian analysis  
Since the raw data comprised discrete quantities of probability placed in fixed intervals it 
was also possible to use these directly as prior discrete probability distributions because it 
was possible to solve the summation in the denominator of Bayes theorem and calculate a 
Bayesian discrete posterior distribution for each practitioner as follows: 
   
            
where  is the probability mass function of the Bayesian posterior distribution,  
is the prior probability mass function,   is the binomial likelihood function, and the 
summation in the denominator is over possible values for  of  We 
compared the results obtained to those derived from the conjugate Bayesian analysis (section 
2.6), in order to make an assessment of the sensitivity of the results to using the discrete 
versus the continuous form of Bayes theorem. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Prior beliefs 
Figure 2 presents summary statistics (95% credible interval and mean) for the 
practitioners’ prior beliefs for  derived from the fitted Beta distributions. In Fig. 2, 
practitioners are ordered vertically by their prior mean. The majority of practitioners had the 
mean of their distribution ≤ 0.3 suggesting that the clinical opinion of practitioners in this 
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sample was an expectation that ITS was either equivalent or superior to cefalonium. 
However, only 8 practitioners (numbers 1-8 in Fig. 2) were entirely convinced of the 
superiority of ITS in the sense that they had their entire 95% credible intervals ≤ 0.3 and 
hence gave minimal probability for ITS being the inferior treatment. Overall, there was 
heterogeneity in clinical beliefs with respect to the efficacy of ITS compared to cephalonium, 
both in terms of centre of location and variance of the prior distributions. As illustrated in 
Fig. 2, several pairs of practitioners had non-over-lapping 95% credible intervals indicating 
very different clinical opinions.  
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Fig. 2 Prior beliefs (95% credible interval and mean) for 20 practitioners for : the 
probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat  seal is infected at calving, given a 
0.3 probability with cephalonium.  
 
3.2 Elicited posterior compared to Bayesian posterior distributions 
For the 20 practitioners, Fig. 3 presents summary statistics for their prior, elicited 
posterior and Bayesian posterior distributions for  derived from the conjugate Bayesian 
analysis; practitioners are ordered vertically by their prior mean.  
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Fig. 3. Summary statistics (95% credible interval and mean) for the prior (blue), elicited 
posterior (red) and Bayesian posterior (black) distributions for 20 practitioners for : the 
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probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat  seal is infected at calving, given a 
0.3 probability with cephalonium.  
In total, 4 out of the 20 practitioners, (numbered 1, 8, 14 and 18 in Fig. 3) updated their 
beliefs perfectly logically in light of the new data, both central location and variance (i.e. 
clinical expectation and confidence).  For all the participants, their prior beliefs were weak 
relative to the strength of new data they were shown, and hence all the Bayesian posterior  
beliefs predominately reflected the new data.  
Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the elicited posterior versus the Bayesian posterior means. 
The dashed diagonal line in Fig. 4 is the line along which the elicited posterior mean equals 
the Bayesian posterior mean. Practitioners falling on this line were exactly in keeping with 
Bayes theorem. Figure 4 shows that most practitioners updated their clinical expectations 
either exactly, or close to, Bayesian logic. 
 
19 
 
Fig. 4.  Scatterplot of elicited posterior versus Bayesian posterior means for 20 practitioners 
regarding : the probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat  seal is infected at 
calving, given a 0.3 probability with cephalonium.  
In marked contrast, however, the majority did not update their uncertainty (i.e. their clinical 
confidence) in keeping with Bayesian logic. Figure 5 presents a scatterplot of the elicited 
posterior versus the Bayesian posterior standard deviations. The diagonal line denotes 
equality and hence practitioners falling on this line updated their uncertainty about  exactly 
in keeping with Bayes theorem.  
 
Fig. 5. Scatterplot of elicited posterior versus Bayesian posterior standard deviations for 20 
practitioners regarding : the probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat  seal is 
infected at calving, given a 0.3 probability with cephalonium.  
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In addition, while not apparent from Figure 3,  eight practitioners (numbers 4, 5, 6, 10, 
12, 15, 16, 20, Fig  3) had elicited posterior distributions with variance less than their prior 
but greater than their Bayesian posterior distribution, and this is reflected in the relative 
widths of their 95% credible intervals in Figure 3. In total, six had elicited posterior 
distributions with variances equal to their prior (numbers 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 19 Figure 3), and 
two had elicited posterior distributions with variances greater than their prior (numbers 2 and 
17, Figure 3); the latter is a considerable departure from Bayes theorem. Thus, most 
practitioners did not draw as much confidence from the new data as was logical. 
 
3.3 Discrete versus conjugate Bayesian analysis  
 
Updating the discrete prior distributions directly gave the same results as fitting parametric 
Beta distributions to the raw data and performing a conjugate Bayesian analysis. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Clinical implications for the prescription of antibiotics versus teat sealants 
The existing evidence suggests that in uninfected quarters at dry-off, using an ITS instead 
of an antibiotic is as effective at preventing new IMI (Rabiee and Lean, 2013). The priors we 
elicited suggest that some practitioners’ are currently not entirely convinced of the efficacy of 
teat sealants when administered correctly. We chose not to give participants a review of the 
current evidence at the start of their interviews and therefore part of the variation in their 
prior beliefs may have been due to differences in their awareness or interpretation of the 
current literature.  
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 The fact that some practitioners’ are currently not entirely convinced of the efficacy of 
teat sealants may play a role in the implementation of SDCT in practice and hence it has 
potential implications for responsible antimicrobial prescribing because using SDCT instead 
of BDCT can considerably reduce antibiotic use.  However, there are, of course, many 
important practical and psychological barriers to implementing SDCT in reality and the 
clinical beliefs of practitioners are just one of many factors in the broader perspective.  
4.2 The use of Bayes theorem and a Bayesian approach in a clinical setting 
Bayes theorem is derived directly from the fundamental axioms of probability theory. 
There is no controversy among statisticians that Bayes theorem per se is correct, in the sense 
that it is the logical way to update prior information based on new data (Spiegelhalter et al., 
2004). Bayes theorem cannot think (!) and as such is impervious to psychological issues, 
heuristics or bias. In contrast, humans on occasion may fall foul of such factors when 
updating their beliefs.  On the other hand, since humans can think they can also consider 
other factors when updating their beliefs which Bayes theorem cannot do, such as how 
trustworthy they consider the new data to be. Therefore, prima facie, it may be tempting to 
believe that it is not appropriate to use Bayes theorem as a gold standard for clinical belief 
updating. There are three key points here, however. 
Firstly, when using Bayes theorem to update data there is an important, albeit 
somewhat implicit, underlying assumption which is that the new data is valid, i.e. that it was 
produced by a robust, appropriately designed and conducted scientific experiment, and that it 
yields information directly about the clinical parameter of interest.  
Secondly, using Bayes theorem and a Bayesian approach does not mean that clinical 
judgement is not important. On the contrary, by taking a Bayesian approach, the existence 
and validity of clinical experience and judgement is formally incorporated into the analysis, 
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in the form of the prior information. This means, for example, that if a practitioner is 
confidently sceptical that a new treatment will not work, based on their current clinical 
experience and knowledge, this will be reflected in their prior probability distribution and 
hence also their posterior distribution and the inferences they will draw from the new data; 
with a strongly sceptical prior the new data would have to be very strong to yield a posterior 
that gives any support for the new treatment. Furthermore, once a practitioner has logically 
updated their beliefs with new data, clinical judgement and human thinking are crucial in 
order to take into consideration a multitude of contextual and social factors that will 
determine how the evidence should be used and applied in clinical practice.   
Lastly, the use of a Bayesian approach in a clinical setting has been steadily growing 
over the last 25 years and it has now permeated all major areas of medical statistics (Ashby, 
2006). It has been strongly argued by leading statisticians and psychologists that clinicians’ 
prior beliefs should be elicited before a new clinical trial commences and a Bayesian 
approach used to facilitate the design, monitoring and interpretation of new data (Edwards et 
al., 1963; Parmar et al., 1994; Spiegelhalter et al., 1994; Berry, 1996; Parmar et al., 2001; 
O'Hagan and Luce, 2003).    
4.3 Clinical expectations versus clinical confidence in belief updating for continuous 
parameters 
It was an interesting contrast to observe that the majority of practitioners updated the 
central location (clinical expectation) of their distributions logically, but the variance (clinical 
confidence) of their beliefs illogically. For this task, the data was centred close to the 
participant’s prior mode and hence in terms of central location per se, the data was not 
radically challenging any of the practitioners’ prior beliefs. In contrast, the strength of the 
evidence they were shown was, for all participants, much stronger than the strength of their 
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prior beliefs (i.e. the variance of their prior distributions). Hence with respect to variance per 
se, the data was challenging the participants’ prior beliefs to a reasonable degree. We 
hypothesize that this may to some extent explain the observed contrast; more negative 
reactions may have been evoked by the greater challenge to their prior beliefs with respect to 
the variance than central location, and negative reactions may impede updating in accordance 
with Bayes theorem. 
4.4 Implications for evidence based veterinary medicine 
Evidence based practice relies heavily on changing practitioners’ beliefs by presenting 
them with new data. The results, however, provide quantitative support for the notion that 
new data which differs from practitioners’ current beliefs can generate uncertainty (Ellsberg, 
1961; Politi et al., 2007). Thus, new data may result in practitioners failing to draw enough 
confidence from the evidence or even in them having weaker beliefs upon which to base their 
clinical decisions than they did before. This ‘psychological handicap’, effectively a hurdle of 
doubt, is important for clinical researchers and data monitoring committees to bear in mind 
when assessing the strength of conviction that new data may bring to the clinical community. 
A difficult decision when conducting a new clinical trial is when to stop it. One 
consideration is whether the accruing evidence is strong enough to be convincing to 
clinicians, even those who currently hold relatively sceptical beliefs about the new treatment 
that is being assessed by the trial. One way to make an assessment of the impact of the 
accruing results of a new trial on clinicians is to use a Bayesian approach (Fayers et al., 
1997). Thus, as the results of a clinical trial accumulate, they could be shown to clinicians 
and their beliefs elicited probabilistically. By doing this at regular intervals of time during the 
clinical trial as an interim analysis, the decision over when to stop the trial would be 
facilitated; when the data is strong enough to result in previously sceptical clinicians having a 
posterior distribution that favours the new treatment, the trial could be stopped.  Using the 
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roulette method employed here, it would not be arduous task to elicit the beliefs of clinicians 
on a regular basis during a clinical trial.  
The results also support the view that some practitioners may benefit from assistance to 
appropriately adjust their current beliefs in the light of new evidence, and in particular it may 
be worthwhile training practitioners to be more comfortable with uncertainty. An 
interpretation section in clinical papers that presents a variety of prior beliefs and 
demonstrates how the trial result should influence them may be helpful. This would enable 
practitioners to self-evaluate how they should adjust their clinical beliefs, and help them to 
make the best use of data. In turn, this would facilitate the efficient uptake of new evidence 
into clinical practice. It is important for clinical researchers to make their results transparent 
and easily interpretable to all practitioners in the context of their current clinical beliefs, and a 
Bayesian framework is ideally suited to this.  Furthermore, the type of task described here 
could be used to help teach the logical updating of clinical beliefs and the concepts of 
Bayesian statistics to clinicians as part of undergraduate or postgraduate training.  
4.5 Assessing the updating of clinical beliefs       
When comparing practitioners’ belief updating to Bayes theorem, it is worth noting that 
it is difficult to differentiate a practitioner who did not express their prior belief accurately as 
a probability distribution from a practitioner who appeared to update their prior belief 
illogically. By following best practice for elicitation, we mitigated this potential bias. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that some practitioners may have specified priors that did not 
reflect their true beliefs.  Interestingly other authors have elicited clinical priors from doctors 
and remarked that some doctors appeared to give over-confident answers given the available 
evidence (Chaloner and Rhame, 2001). We hypothesise that, psychologically, at least some 
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practitioners’ may have difficulties separating their bedside manner from their own 
uncertainty with respect to the evidence.  
Other psychological issues in the updating of clinical beliefs that could usefully be 
explored in further studies include the consequences of believing the new information for a 
practitioner’s previous and future actions. Practitioners may be resistant to change and react 
against it simply because they have perceptions that treatments they have used have worked 
in the past and their prior beliefs are overly and inaccurately strong (Brehm, 1966).  
Furthermore in practice, practitioners’ will usually update their clinical beliefs without 
being required to specifically think and probabilistically quantify what they currently believe 
first; thus of primary importance is how they update their clinical beliefs without having to 
first think and express their beliefs probabilistically. This is unfortunate, given it is currently 
impossible to know if a person has updated their belief logically, without in some way 
ascertaining what it was they believed to begin with.  Of relevance here, is the existing debate 
in the literature over whether practitioners’ have beliefs that already exist, pre-formed and 
coherent, and hence are ‘ready for the taking’ by elicitation (Lindley et al., 1979), or 
alternatively, whether their beliefs exist in a more diffuse state, and hence are ‘conjured up on 
the fly’ in response to the elicitation task itself (Winkler, 1967); if the latter is true, then we 
speculate that any potential differences between measurable and actual belief updating in 
practice, may be greater.  
4.6 Use of discrete versus continuous probability distributions  
We chose the roulette method to probabilistically elicit beliefs which directly 
produced discrete prior probability distributions, and in our case it was possible to explicitly 
(by hand) calculate the summation in the denominator of Bayes theorem to yield a discrete 
posterior distribution.  However many methods to elicit beliefs do not produce discrete 
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probability distributions, instead a small number of summary statistics are elicited and it is 
common practice and mathematically convenient to fit continuous parametric distributions to 
the raw data to represent the prior beliefs. With the prior beliefs expressed in this format, a 
conjugate analysis (or in more complex cases, sophisticated simulation techniques) are 
needed to solve Bayes theorem and derive the posterior distribution.   
The extent to which a fitted parametric density function actually represents what a 
person believes is a non-trivial statistical problem within the field of probabilistic elicitation 
that has not yet been resolved (Garthwaite et al., 2005; O'Hagan et al., 2006; Oakley and 
O'Hagan, 2007). This is because to specify the uncertainty in a continuous random variable X 
uniquely as a probability distribution requires eliciting an infinite collection of probability 
statements from the person, , which is impossible. The person can only 
provide a finite summary of their beliefs. 
In our case, given we could both fit parametric distributions to our raw data and use 
the discretely elicited prior distributions directly, it was of interest to do both and compare the 
results.  We chose to present the results using 95% credible intervals and means derived from 
the conjugate analysis using the fitted parametric distributions for convenience and reader 
familiarity.   
4.7 Limitations 
The results are conditional on the task as it was set and in particular our choice of the 
roulette method and the way we chose to challenge their beliefs (strength and central location 
of the new data). It is possible that different results would be obtained using a different 
methodological approach, thus repetition of this type of study is warranted. Furthermore, our 
design does not take account of any clustering of the data which may be relevant and add 
complexity to the design of the task. In addition, any method must be acceptable to 
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practitioners themselves and as simple as possible. Our perception was that the practitioners 
in our sample found the methodology acceptable; however the training exercise is important. 
The fact that this study used fictitious data may potentially have given rise to some 
psychological implications, particularly that the results may not have been believed. Steps 
were taken to overcome this, however, including specifically emphasising at the outset that 
the task required participants to ‘use their imagination and really believe’ the trial results. 
Indeed, in our experience it is crucial to remind practitioners at the end of the interview that 
the data are synthetic in order to avoid them transferring incorrect information to clients. 
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Figures and captions (black and white versions) 
 
Fig.1. The 3 examples used for training. Each circle denotes a 0.10 probability. Example 1 
represents a “confident” belief that treatment B is inferior to A. Example 2 represents the 
belief that treatment B is superior to A; it is a less confident belief relative to example 1. 
Example 3 represents a belief that favours treatment B, but allows some probability that A is 
superior. 
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Fig. 2 Prior beliefs (95% credible interval and mean) for 20 practitioners for : the 
probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat  seal is infected at calving, given a 
0.3 probability with cephalonium.  
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Fig. 3. Summary statistics (95% credible interval and mean) for the prior (diamond), elicited 
posterior (dot) and Bayesian posterior (cross) distributions for 20 practitioners for : the 
probability that an uninfected quarter treated with a teat seal is infected at calving, given a 0.3 
probability with cephalonium.  
